Do Parties Matter for Fiscal Policy Choices

In this paper I test whether there are strategic considerations in the making of fiscal policy. The general idea is that if a government anticipates the possibility of defeat in the next election it will try to use the debt strategically in order to influence the policy of its successor. Previous empirical studies have either rejected the strategic explanation of debt or have not been able to isolate this effect. I argue that these findings might be due to potential difficulties with the data sets used. To come to grips with these problems I make use of a data set from Swedish local governments. The main advantages of this panel data set are the institutional and constitutional homogeneity of the sample and the large number of observations from elections, nearly 2000. The main findings of this paper strongly suggest that there are strategic considerations in the making of fiscal policy. A right-wing government accumulates more debt during its term of office if it thinks that it will be defeated as compared to when it expects to remain in office. On the other hand, a left-wing government decreases the level of debt the higher the possibility of its defeat. Moreover, the larger the inherited debt the more a newly elected government has to reduce spending. These results are consistent with the predictions from a model developed by Persson and Svensson (1989).

An Empirical Investigation of the Strategic Use of Debt

In this paper I test two models of strategic debt behavior. The general idea is that if a government anticipates the possibility of defeat in the next election it will try to use the debt strategically in order to influence the policy of its successor. Previous empirical studies have either rejected the strategic explanation of debt or have not been able to isolate this effect. I argue that these findings are perhaps less surprising since there are several potential difficulties using U.S. or OECD data to test the strategic explanation. One problem with the U.S. data is the scarcity of degrees of freedom while a problem with the OECD data is the pooling assumption. To come to grips with these two problems I use a data set from Swedish local governments. The main advantages of this panel data set are the homogeneity of the sample and the large number of observations from elections, nearly 2000. After controlling for other possible economic and demographic determinants of debt behavior, the main findings of this paper strongly suggest that a right-wing government accumulates more debt during its term of office if it thinks that it will be defeated as compared to when it expects to remain in office. On the other hand, a left-wing government decreases the level of debt the higher the possibility of its defeat. Moreover, the larger the inherited debt the more a newly elected government has to reduce spending and raise taxes. These results are consistent with the predictions from a model developed by Persson and Svensson (1989).Debt; Political economy; Fiscal policy

A Test of the Rational Electoral-Cycle Hypothesis

This paper develops a three-step empirical methodology to test the rational electoralcycle hypothesis. The first step consists of testing for the existence of electoral cycles in fiscal policy. The second step conducts three tests for how such cycles should depend on election outcomes as suggested by recent political agency models. The third step is to regress electoral success on fiscal policy. This three-step approach is applied to a panel of Swedish local governments with more than 2000 observations from elections. The findings are as follows: (i) spending is raised and taxes are cut in the election year, (ii) in the election year, spending is higher for a government that will be re-elected as compared to those that will not be re-appointed, (iii) in the post-election year, spending is higher and taxes are lower for re-elected governments than for newly elected ones, (iv) reelected governments spend less and tax more in the post-election year as compared to the election year, (v) conditional on taxes, spending is positively related to electoral success. These set of findings are consistent with Rogoff’s equilibrium budget cycle model where a government signals its competence through cycles in fiscal policy.political agency; electoral budget cycles; accountability

Do Parties Matter for Fiscal Policy Choices? A Regression-Discontinuity Approach

This paper presents a method for measuring the causal effect of party control on fiscal policy outcomes. The source of identifying information comes from an institutional feature of the election system, namely that party control changes discontinuously at 50 percent of the vote share, i.e., a party that receives more than 50 percent of the votes will be in office. The approach is applied to a very large panel data set from Swedish local governments, which offers a number of attractive features. The results show that there is large and significant party effect: on average, left-wing parties spend and tax 2.5 percent more than right-wing governments. The party effect constitutes 1 percent of average municipality income, clearly a sizeable effect.political parties; party control; regression-discontinuity design

Level Set Methods for Stochastic Discontinuity Detection in Nonlinear Problems

Stochastic physical problems governed by nonlinear conservation laws are challenging due to solution discontinuities in stochastic and physical space. In this paper, we present a level set method to track discontinuities in stochastic space by solving a Hamilton-Jacobi equation. By introducing a speed function that vanishes at discontinuities, the iso-zero of the level set problem coincide with the discontinuities of the conservation law. The level set problem is solved on a sequence of successively finer grids in stochastic space. The method is adaptive in the sense that costly evaluations of the conservation law of interest are only performed in the vicinity of the discontinuities during the refinement stage. In regions of stochastic space where the solution is smooth, a surrogate method replaces expensive evaluations of the conservation law. The proposed method is tested in conjunction with different sets of localized orthogonal basis functions on simplex elements, as well as frames based on piecewise polynomials conforming to the level set function. The performance of the proposed method is compared to existing adaptive multi-element generalized polynomial chaos methods

An Empirical Approach for Evaluating Soft Budget Constraints

In this paper, we develop an empirical framework for detecting the existence and estimating the magnitude of the softness of a budget constraint. The defining feature of a soft budget constraint is a subordinate organization’s expectations of being bailed out by a superior organization in case of financial trouble. This implies that one has to link the organization’s expectations for being bailed out to its fiscal behavior in order to quantify the extent of the soft budget constraint. We postulate that expectations for bailouts are formed rationally and make use of an instrumental variable method to get consistent estimates of the parameters of interest. We argue that past own experience of being bailed out and bailouts of other subordinate organizations can be used to construct credible instruments for the formation of bailout expectations. We apply our empirical approach to a unique panel data set of 286 Swedish local governments where the central government provided a total of 1,697 bailouts between 1974 and 1992. Our results strongly suggest the existence of a soft budget constraint; a local government increases its level of debt by 6-10 percent if it expects to be bailed out with probability one as compared to when the likelihood is zero due to previous experience of being bailed out, while the effect on debt from bailouts of its geographical neighbors is roughly four times as large.Soft budget constraint; Bailout; Fiscal distress; Intergovernmental relations

Does child spacing affect children’s outcomes? Evidence from a Swedish reform

In this paper, we provide evidence of whether child spacing affects the future success of children. As an exogenous source of variation in child spacing, we make use of the introduction of an administrative rule in the parental leave benefit system in Sweden. This rule made it possible for a woman to retain her previous high level of parental leave benefits, i.e., 90 percent wage replacement, without entering the labor market between births provided that the interval between the births did not exceed 24 months. The rule had a much larger effect on the birth spacing behavior for native-born mothers compared to foreign-born mothers due to their differential attachment to the labor market. We find that the rule caused a reduction in spacing among native-born mothers as compared to the foreign-born mothers. For individuals born by native-born mothers, the reform also caused a decrease in educational attainment. Thus, this suggests that the effect of spacing children closer has a negative impact on children’s future outcomes. We provide additional evidence that this is likely due to the strong effects of early environment on the capacity for human skill development as discussed by Knutsen et al. (2006).Child spacing; parental leave; child school performance

Lungworms (Metastrongylus spp.) demonstrated in domestic pigs with respiratory disease: was there a clinical relevance?

Background An outdoor pig herd was affected by severe respiratory disease in one out of three pastures. At necropsy, Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae and Pasteurella multocida were detected in the lungs, as well as the lung worm Metastrongylus apri. The life cycle of Metastrongylus spp. includes earthworms as intermediate hosts, and since domestic pigs mainly are reared indoors, lungworm infections have not been diagnosed in domestic pigs in Sweden for decades, not even in pigs reared outdoors. Therefore, this disease outbreak was scrutinised from the view of validating the impact of Metastrongylus spp. Results At the time of the disease outbreak, neither eggs of Metastrongylus spp., Trichuris suis nor Ascaris suum were detected in faeces of pigs aged ten weeks. In contrast, five-months-old pigs at the pasture with respiratory disease shed up to 3800 eggs per gram (Epg) of Ascaris suum and up to 1100 Epg of Trichuris suis, whereas eggs of these parasites were not demonstrated in healthy pigs aged six months at another pasture. Low numbers of eggs from Metastrongylus spp. (< 150 Epg) were seen in faecal samples from both these age categories. At slaughter, seven weeks later, ten normal weighted pigs in the preceding healthy batch were compared with ten normal weighted and five small pigs from the affected batch. Healing Mycoplasma-like pneumonic lesions were seen in all groups. All small pigs shed eggs of Ascaris suum in the faeces, compared to around 50% of the larger pigs. Metastrongylus spp. were demonstrated in 13 of the 25 pigs (52%), representing all groups included. Conclusion As Metastrongylus spp. were demonstrated regardless of health status, and also in another healthy outdoor herd, the impact of Metastrongylus spp. on the outbreak of respiratory disease was depreciated. Instead, a possible association with a high burden of Ascaris suum was suggested to have preceded the severe outbreak with respiratory disease in the affected herd. Further, it was concluded that Metastrongylus spp. will escape detection at routine meat inspections made at slaughterhouses, and as they appeared to generally not induce clinical signs of respiratory disease Metastrongylus spp. may be more common in outdoor production than previously believed